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A NUMBER of proposals  for new methods to fight inflation  are being 
opposed,  especially  by labor organizations  and the business  community. 
Included  among the old methods to fight inflation  are restrictive  mon- 
etary  and  fiscal  policies,  wage  and  price  controls,  and  exhortation  or "jaw- 
boning," all of which have been used in the United States at various 
times in the past thirty years. Among the new methods are reductions 
in excise, sales, and payroll taxes; tax-based  incomes policies (TIPs); 
and deregulation,  or the elimination  of "sacred  cows." This paper ex- 
plores possible reasons for opposition  to these more recent proposals, 
with  major  attention  devoted  to TIPs. 
The existence  of opposition  is well known, but little explanation  for 
it has appeared  on the record. When considering  objections  to a pro- 
posed policy, it is important  to keep in mind that not all objections  are 
consistent  with one another.  For example,  some emphasize  reasons  why 
a proposed  policy might  not work, and others  point out possible adverse 
consequences  if it does work. These two kinds of objections  cannot be 
valid  simultaneously,  but it might  not be possible  to determine  in advance 
which  to take  more  seriously. 
It is far easier  to list objections  to a proposed  policy than it is to ad- 
vance a better one. For this reason I do not attempt  to distinguish  be- 
Note:  I am indebted to Daniel Quinn Mills and participants of the Brookings 
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tween  two alternative  purposes  of the objections  discussed.  They can be 
viewed  either  as grounds  for rejecting  a policy altogether  or as points to 
be considered  in trying  to improve  the proposals  under discussion  and 
make  them  more  workable. 
Excise  and  Payroll  Tax Reduction 
Sales and excise taxes, unlike income taxes, enter directly into the 
measurement  of consumer  prices. A reduction  in these taxes therefore 
produces  a one-time  reduction  in the price level.' Although  this will not 
offset  a continuing  source  of inflation  such as an overly  expansive  mone- 
tary  policy,  it has an effect  opposite  to that  of the unique  events  that  have 
helped  to raise  the price  level in recent  years,  such  as the formation  of the 
oil cartel  by the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries. 
Unlike  some of the policies discussed  below, reductions  in excise  taxes 
should be highly acceptable  to both business and labor. For example, 
the reduction  in the excise tax on telephone  service  proposed  by Presi- 
dent  Carter  in January  1978 is clearly  directly  beneficial  to the telephone 
companies, their employees, and the communication  workers' union. 
Even if the reduction  were  entirely  passed  on to consumers  through  lower 
rates,  it would increase  the quantity  of telephone  services  demanded  and 
therefore  the demand  for labor  in the telephone  industry. 
The support  of such tax reductions  by business  and labor should  also 
extend  beyond  the industries  directly  affected.  The labor  movement  gen- 
erally  regards  income taxes as more equitable  than excise taxes because 
they are progressive  rather  than regressive.  Businessmen  often favor cut- 
ting taxes  whenever  possible  in the hope that  this will eventually  result  in 
a corresponding  restraint  on government  expenditures,  much of which 
they  may  regard  as wasteful. 
The reduction  of excise taxes to lower  prices  raises  a number  of prob- 
1. By one-time changes in prices I do not mean to suggest  that the events that give 
rise to them have no secondary effects. A reduction in excise taxes could have sec- 
ondary effects through  the operation  of cost-of-living escalator  provisions or through 
a moderating  influence  on newly negotiated  wage settlements.  The term "one-time"  is 
intended  to mean that such secondary  effects will have a tendency to diminish  in am- 
plitude and eventually  will die out. For a more precise statement  of the effect of a one- 
time reduction in prices on the subsequent  rate of inflation,  see the comments on the 
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lems. The federal  government  has few excise taxes  remaining  that can be 
reduced,  and the important  ones (gasoline,  liquor,  and tobacco) can all 
be defended  on special  grounds.  An alternative  proposal  is to induce  states 
and localities to reduce sales taxes by replacing  the lost revenues  with 
federal  funds. The problems  of this proposal  lie in the area of intergov- 
ernmental  relations  rather  than in relations  between  the government  and 
private  sectors-an  area  that will not be explored  here. 
A reduction  in payroll  taxes  will also tend  to produce  a one-time  reduc- 
tion  in the  price  level to the extent  that  the costs  of payroll  taxes  are  passed 
forward  in the price of products,  and this pass-through  is probably  sub- 
stantial.  A modest  proposal  of this sort was made by President  Carter  in 
January  1977 when  he proposed  a small  reduction  in the federal  payroll 
tax for unemployment  insurance.  Much more ambitious  proposals  have 
been  introduced  in Congress,  which  would  shift  the financing  of the Medi- 
care  and  disability  insurance  programs  from  payroll  taxes  to general  reve- 
nues. These proposals  are favorable  to the economic  interests  of unions 
and  corporations  and  to most low-income  individual  taxpayers  for whom 
payroll  taxes are more important  than personal  income  taxes. However, 
unless  the cost of the programs  being financed  is reduced,  the proposals 
will either  require  an increase  in personal  income  taxes or a smaller  de- 
crease  than  would  otherwise  be possible.  It is difficult  to predict  the reac- 
tion of business  leaders  to proposals  that  would  benefit  their  corporations 
at some possible cost to them as individual  taxpayers.  The cost may be 
small,  inasmuch  as current  proposals  for reducing  individual  income  taxes 
do not greatly  affect  those  in high  tax brackets. 
It is not obvious that it would be possible to lower the price level by 
reducing  payroll  taxes and to restore  the lost revenue  by increasing  cor- 
porate  income  taxes  or by decreasing  them  less. Corporate  taxes  may also 
be passed  forward  to consumers  to a considerable  extent,  and  not enough 
is known about tax incidence  to predict  how much different  the pass- 
through  to prices  is for the corporate  tax and  for the payroll  tax. 
Tax-Based  Incomes  Policies 
Tax-based  incomes  policies (TIPs) have been discussed  for a number 
of years,  but recently  have  received  wider  attention  and  support.  The ear- 
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proposal  to increase  the corporate  income  tax  rate  for corporations  whose 
wage  increases  exceed  a specified  guideline.2  More  recent  proposals  differ 
from  Wallich-Weintraub  by suggesting  tax incentives  for compliance  with 
both price and wage guidelines  and by suggesting  tax reductions  to cor- 
porations  and workers  in place of or in addition  to tax increases.  Some 
of these proposals  were considered  by Wallich  and Weintraub,  who re- 
garded  them  as less desirable  than  their  own. 
The general  attitude  of business  and labor toward  the TIP proposals 
reminds  one of the famous New Yorker  cartoon  in which a mother  is 
trying  to persuade  a small  girl to eat her broccoli,  and the girl replies,  "I 
say it's spinach  and to hell with it." Business  and labor are now firmly 
opposed to wage and price controls, and they consider  TIP as another 
form  of control.  In the sections  that  follow, I explore  some  of the similari- 
ties and differences  between  TIPs and controls  from the perspective  of 
labor  and  management. 
SCOPE  AND  COVERAGE 
The Wallich-Weintraub  proposal  would apply  to all corporations  pay- 
ing corporate  income tax, with a possible exemption  for small corpora- 
tions. This is a far narrower  scope than  that  of the wage  controls  in effect 
during  the period 1971-74; those controls  covered  partnerships  and  pro- 
prietorships,  state and local governments,  and nonprofit  institutions.  The 
last two of these have been areas of rapid  growth  of unionism  and col- 
lective bargaining  in recent years. It is quite possible that in the future 
strong  pressures  for wage increases  could originate  in the unions of the 
public  sector.  This appears  to have happened  in Canada  in recent  years; 
the level of wage  settlements  there  has exceeded  that  in the United  States, 
despite  the fact that  workers  in the private  sector  in the two countries  are 
largely  represented  by the same  set of unions. 
The exemption  for small firms and the exclusion of unincorporated 
business  would exclude from coverage  many firms  in construction  and 
trucking,  which are industries  with both high wages and strong  unions. 
2.  See Henry C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub,  "A Tax-Based Incomes Policy," 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 5 (June 1971), pp. 1-19. Similar proposals previ- 
ously had been advanced by the two authors separately.  See Wallich, "Can  We Stop 
Inflation  without a Recession?"  Newsweek, vol. 68 (September 5, 1966), pp. 72-73, 
and Weintraub,  "An Incomes Policy to Stop Inflation,"  Lloyds Bank Review, no. 99 
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Wallich has suggested  that special policies to restrain  wages might be 
needed for these industries.  Unfortunately,  he has not stated  what these 
policies would be. The exclusion  of trucking  would be especially  impor- 
tant because the International  Brotherhood  of Teamsters  is the largest 
and  one of the strongest  unions  in the United  States,  and  its master  freight 
agreement  has an important  pattern-setting  influence  beyond trucking, 
especially  in food wholesaling  and retailing.  More generally,  the exemp- 
tion for small  firms  could lead to spillovers  of wage increases  from small 
firms  to larger  ones, or could  lead to distortions  of relative  wages. 
One supporter  of TIP, Laurence  Seidman,  has proposed  an exemption 
for "very  low-paid"  workers,  without  specifying  how those  workers  would 
be defined.3  Past experience  shows that such an exemption  would have 
strong  support  in Congress,  but could seriously  diminish  the effectiveness 
of TIP. For example,  the 1973 extension  of the Economic  Stabilization 
Act exempted  low-wage workers  from wage controls effective  May 1, 
1973, and  defined  them  as those earning  less than  $3.50 an hour.4  In May 
1973, all production  and nonsupervisory  workers  in private  nonagricul- 
tural employment  were receiving  average  hourly earnings  of $3.85, so 
that almost half of this group  was excluded  from wage controls  by this 
exemption. 
It should also be recognized  that TIP would not apply to those large 
private  corporations  that  have no tax liability  because  they are  not profit- 
able  in a particular  year  or because  they  carry  forward  tax credits.  A union 
such as the retail clerks or the meatcutters  negotiating  under TIP with 
several  supermarket  chains  in the same geographical  area might choose 
to make a pattern-setting  agreement  with an unprofitable  chain, which 
has no tax disincentive  applicable  to wage increases  above the guideline 
and has the least financial  ability  to resist  a strike.  The union could then 
confront  the profitable  chains  with a newly established  wage rate, and it 
would  be difficult  for them  not to match  it. 
Some advocates  of TIP may  feel that  the concentration  of penalties  on 
profitable  firms is desirable  because high profits encourage  large wage 
increases.  Little solid evidence exists to support  this view, however.  In 
such industries  as railroads  and shipping,  unions  have bargained  for and 
3. Laurence S. Seidman, "To Fight Inflation,"  New York Times, December 22, 
1976, p. 29. 
4.  U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  Office  of Economic Stabilization,  Historical 
Working  Papers on the Economic Stabilization  Program, August 15, 1971 to April 
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won high  wages  and  costly  manning  requirements  not only from  unprofit- 
able  firms,  but  even  from  bankrupt  ones. 
The scope of the Wallich-Weintraub  proposal could be greatly ex- 
tended  by applying  the tax penalty to payroll taxes rather  than to cor- 
porate income taxes. It would then include unincorporated  businesses, 
corporations  with no tax liability,  nonprofit  institutions,  and those state 
and local governments  that participate  in the social security  system. 
Wallich  and Weintraub  argue  against  the use of payroll  taxes  for TIP 
on the ground  that those taxes are more likely to be passed forward  in 
prices than are corporate  income taxes. It is easier  for me to agree that 
payroll  taxes are passed  forward  than to accept  the view that corporate 
income taxes are not. If one corporation  in a competitive  industry  nego- 
tiated a wage increase  above the guideline  established  by TIP and paid 
the resulting  corporate  income  tax penalty,  the firm  would  have difficulty 
passing the penalty forward  because its competitors  would have both 
lower wage costs and lower taxes. In some cases, however,  wage agree- 
ments  are negotiated  with entire  industries,  such as basic steel. In others, 
such as automobiles,  an agreement  reached  with one major  producer  is 
extended  to the others  with little or no change.  If in such cases one firm 
reaches a wage agreement  that exceeds the guideline  and results  in tax 
penalties,  it might set higher  prices to restore  in large part the previous 
rate of return  on capital  after  taxes.  Both the wage  increase  and  the price 
increase  would then probably  be followed  by other  firms  in the industry. 
Indeed, in industries  where demand  for a product  is relatively  inelastic, 
the only major  barrier  to such an outcome  would  seem  to be foreign  com- 
petition.  For TIP to be effective  in industries  characterized  both by price 
leadership  and  by industry-wide  bargaining  or pattern-following  in wages, 
guidelines  and penalties  would be required  for excessive  price increases. 
Such  proposals  are  discussed  below. 
Another difference  between the use of corporate  income taxes and 
payroll  taxes as a base for TIP is that the penalty  rates of payroll  taxes 
would augment  the effect  of higher  wages in inducing  the substitution  of 
capital  for labor. The use of corporate  income taxes would presumably 
not induce factor substitution  or, if anything,  would cause substitution 
of labor  for capital. 
The Wallich-Weintraub  proposal  is limited  to wages because its pro- 
ponents  believe that markups  of prices  over unit labor costs are histori- 
cally  quite  stable.  In Weintraub's  words,  TIP "presupposes  that  the wage- Albert  Rees  459 
productivity  nexus is crucial in inflation."5  Thus, in Weintraub's  view, 
postwar  inflation  has been essentially  wage-push  inflation.  Needless to 
say, the unions (among others) vigorously  disagree  with this view; they 
would point to the rises in prices of raw agricultural  commodities  and 
imported  petroleum  and to the devaluation  of the dollar since 1971 as 
contributors  to inflation  for which they bear no responsibility.  They re- 
gard  the Wallich-Weintraub  proposal  as completely  one-sided  and there- 
fore unfair  to labor.  Although  unions  are  opposed  to any  kind  of incomes 
policy,  they are most strongly  opposed  to one that  focuses exclusively  on 
wages.  They  would  fight  its enactment  by the Congress  with  as much  force 
as an aroused  labor  movement  can muster,  which  is considerable. 
The view that price inflation  merely  mirrors  wage inflation  has been 
somewhat  shaken  by the events  of recent  years.  From 1973 to 1974 the 
consumer  price  index  rose 11.0 percent,  while average  hourly  earnings  in 
private  nonagricultural  industry  rose only 8.2 percent,  producing  a de- 
cline  of 2.5 percent  in real  hourly  earnings.  Although  the events of 1974 
were  highly  unusual,  the labor  movement  certainly  cannot  be blamed  for 
wanting  insurance  against  their  repetition  (which is not to say that they 
necessarily  should  have  it) .6 
ESTABLISHING  THE  GUIDELINE 
The  problem  of establishing  an appropriate  wage  guideline  is not much 
different  under  TIP than  it is under  wage  controls,  but this does not mean 
that  it is unimportant.  Perhaps  the principal  difference  is that  TIP neces- 
sarily  involves  an explicit  guideline,  while  wage  controls  do not. The Con- 
struction  Industry  Stabilization  Committee,  the most successful  of the 
wage-control  bodies of the 1971-74 period,  operated  without  an explicit 
wage  guideline  throughout  its existence. 
Labor  unions oppose a wage guideline  in part because  they fear that 
it might  be unfairly  set or that it would not be appropriately  modified  to 
changing  conditions.  Both concerns  are based on past experience. 
Wallich  and Weintraub  suggest  a wage guideline  that could be estab- 
5. Sidney Weintraub, "Incomes Policy: Completing the Stabilization Triangle," 
Journal  of Econzomic  Issuces,  vol. 6 (December 1972), p. 119. 
6. Some analysts would prefer to use compensation per hour of labor in the 
private  sector for this kind of analysis.  However, the unions focus on the hourly earn- 
ings of production and nonsupervisory  workers because they have few members in 
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lished  at some  point  between  a minimum  equal  to the trend  of output  per 
labor hour and a maximum  equal to this trend plus the initial rate of 
inflation.)  Their  minimum  is the same as the wage guideline  established 
by the Kennedy  administration  in 1962, and could be used in a situation 
in which the initial rate of inflation  was zero or close to it. Even under 
these circumstances,  this guideline  is not acceptable  to the labor move- 
ment.  It is well known  that increasing  wages  in proportion  to output  per 
labor  hour  will keep constant  the labor  and  nonlabor  shares  of output  and 
income.  In other  words,  this guideline  freezes  the functional  distribution 
of income. Historically,  however,  there has been a tendency  for labor's 
share  of income  to rise gradually  through  time, even after  adjustment  for 
the decline in self-employment.8  Understandably,  labor does not want 
this historical  trend  that  is favorable  to its constituents  brought  to a halt, 
not even  temporarily. 
A rough  check  on whether  guidelines  actually  had  this effect  on labor's 
share  is afforded  by computing  the compensation  of employees  as a per- 
centage of national income for selected years. This figure  was 71.6 in 
1961 before the Kennedy  guidelines  and 70.6 in 1966; it was 76.3 in 
1970 before the Nixon controls and 75.1 in 1973. I would ascribe  the 
declines  in labor's  share  during  the periods  of guidelines  and controls  to 
the business  cycle rather  than  to incomes  policy. However,  the sharp  rise 
in labor's  share  during  the intervening  period  when  there  was no incomes 
policy is also noteworthy.  In any event,  the labor movement  is not likely 
to draw  favorable  conclusions  about  guidelines  from these figures. 
The opposite extreme  in the range  of possible  wage guidelines  of the 
Wallich-Weintraub  proposal  would surely  not be acceptable  to business. 
To allow wages  to increase  by the trend  of productivity  plus a full allow- 
ance  for inflation  is to allow  labor  larger  gains  than  it has  been able  to win 
in the period since mid-1974,  when there  have been no guidelines.  If we 
accept 2 percent as a rough estimate  of the trend of productivity,  real 
hourly  earnings  of all employees  in the private  nonagricultural  sector  have 
not risen as much as this trend since 1972. A guideline  of productivity 
plus a full allowance  for inflation  therefore  seem  more  likely  to accelerate 
wage  increases  than  to retard  them. 
7.  "A Tax-Based  Incomes Policy,"  p. 12. 
8. See Irving B. Kravis, "Income Distribution: Functional Share," in David L. 
Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of  the Social Sciences, vol.  7  (Macmillan, 
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Intermediate  positioiis,  such as the trend  of productivity  plus half the 
rate  of inflation,  seem superior  to the extremes,  but even these have sub- 
stantial  difficulties.  If the initial rate of inflation  were 6 percent  and the 
trend  of productivity  2 percent,  a wage  guideline  of 5 percent  would  result. 
If such a guideline  were enforced,  real output  per labor hour could rise 
at a rate  of 2 percent  a year, and real wages  would  initially  fall 1 percent 
a year-an  outcome totally unacceptable  to the unions. Eventually  the 
rate of inflation  should  decline to 3 percent  if the program  is successful, 
but the unions  might  not be patient  enough  to wait for this. Moreover,  at 
this  point the wage guideline  would  be reduced  to 3.5 percent,  again  pro- 
ducing  a real wage gain much  lower than the trend  of productivity.  Only 
in some final equilibrium  where  prices are not rising  at all do real wages 
rise  with  the productivity  trend. 
I conclude  that if there  is to be a wage guideline  acceptable  to unions, 
it cannot  include  a constant  allowance  for ongoing  inflation,  but  may  need 
to adjust  that allowance  each year. Formulas  based on theoretical  con- 
siderations  may be inferior  to more arbitrary  ones based on simple de- 
celeration  from existing  rates  of increase  in compensation.  For the guide- 
line to be acceptable  and  fair,  it must  allow  for growth  in real  wages.  For 
the guideline  to have any effect in restraining  inflation,  it must be less 
than the wage increases  that would occur in its absence.  It is not clear 
that a number  always  exists  that meets  both of these constraints;  indeed, 
it is not even  clear  that  one exists  at  present. 
Labor's  fear  that  a guideline  might  become  less favorable  to the  interests 
of workers  over time is supported  by the events of both 1962-67  and 
1971-74.  When the Kennedy administration  adopted wage guidelines 
based on productivity  in 1962, the trend  of productivity  change  was sub- 
stantially  above  the  rise  in consumer  prices,  so that  a guideline  based  solely 
on productivity  provided  for considerable  growth  in real  wages.  By 1966, 
the guideline  had become a specific  number-3.2  percent  a year.  During 
1966, as the Council of Economic Advisers  noted in its January  1967 
report, consumer  prices rose 3.3 percent. Adherence  to the guidelines 
therefore  implied  a slight  fall in real wages.  The council  nevertheless  did 
not change  the guideline  number.9 
9.  See Economic Report of  the President, January 1967, pp. 127-29.  Because 
the position of  the council was somewhat ambiguous, a direct quotation may be 
helpful: "The Council recognizes that the recent rise in living costs makes it unlikely 
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A second aspect of the 1966-67  guidelines  was also disturbing  to 
the labor  movement.  The 3.2 percent  figure  that  became  the wage guide- 
line was the latest average  of the increase  in output  per labor  hour  in the 
private  sector for the five-year  periods ending  in 1963 and in 1964, as 
measured  at the end of those  years.  For the five years  ending  in 1965, the 
corresponding  figure was 3.4 percent. In its January  1966 report the 
council  did not accept  this higher  figure  as a basis for revising  the guide- 
line on the ground  that  five consecutive  years  of economic  expansion  had 
created  a productivity  gain that was above the long-term  trend.10  Al- 
though this belated recognition  that five years is too short a period to 
establish  a trend  was probably  correct,  the unions  were  offended  because 
the rules had been changed  in the middle of the game. Their sense of 
grievance,  oddly enough,  existed  although-according to knowledgeable 
observers  of collective  bargaining-the guidelines  had little or no effect 
in restraining  negotiated  wage  settlements.11 
The 1962-66 experience  was repeated  in 1971-74. In November  1971 
the Pay Board  set the general  pay standard  for the new wage  control  pro- 
gram  at 5.5 percent.  This was widely  interpreted  as based  on a combina- 
tion of  the long-run productivity  trend and a portion of the current 
increase  in consumer  prices.  The productivity  trend  was then about  3 per- 
cent a year, and the controls  program  was expected  to reduce  the rate 
of inflation  to 2.5 percent  by the end of 1972. A 5.5 percent  wage stan- 
dard  minus  a 3.0 percent  productivity  trend  implies  a 2.5 percent  rate  of 
increase  of unit labor costs, which  is consistent  with an equal  increase  in 
prices.  By 1973, however,  the rate  of increase  of the consumer  price  index 
(December  1972 to December  1973) was 8.8 percent.  Nevertheless,  the 
5.5 percent  wage  standard  was never  formally  abandoned  during  the con- 
trols programs,  though exceptions  to it became more and more numer- 
ous. 
increase  of productivity.  But it sees no useful purpose  to be served  by suggesting  some 
higher  standard  for wage increases,  even on a temporary  basis. 
"The only valid and noninflationary  standard for wage advances is the produc- 
tivity principle. If price stability is eventually to be restored and maintained in a 
high-employment  U.S. economy, wage settlements  must once again conform to that 
standard"  (p. 128). 
10. Economic Report of the President,  January  1966, p. 92. 
11. See John T.  Dunlop, "Guideposts, Wages, and Collective Bargaining,"  in 
George P. Shultz and Robert Z. Aliber, eds., Guidelines,  Informal Controls, and the 
Market Place: Policy Choices in a Full Employment Economy (University of Chi- 
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Those  proponents  of TIP who advocate  tax penalties  or bonuses  based 
on both price  increases  and wage  increases  usually  select a pair  of guide- 
lines that differ  by the trend  of output  per labor hour.  If this trend  were 
2 percent,  they might  propose  a wage guideline  of 6 percent  and a price 
guideline  of 4 percent.12  Such  a pair  of guidelines  is consistent,  on average 
across  all industries,  with  unit  labor  costs  rising  as fast as the price  guide- 
lines. 
The problems  of establishing  a price guideline,  however, are much 
more formidable  than those of setting  a wage guideline.  Okun  suggests  a 
"dollar-and-cents  pass-through  of any increases  in costs of materials  and 
supplies."13  These costs would presumably  differ  according  to the prod- 
uct, which would make departures  from the price guideline  difficult  to 
detect. Moreover,  the term "materials  and supplies"  may be overly  nar- 
row.  Are corporations  to absorb  all increases  above  4 percent  in the costs 
of purchased  services,  such as legal and accounting  fees, travel  costs, and 
so on? But eveni  if there  were no increases  in the costs of materials,  sup- 
plies, and purchased  services,  a uniform  price guideline  would be unfair 
because  the  productivity  trends  of individual  industries  differ  dramatically 
from  that  of the economy  as a whole.  It is reasonable  to state  that  workers 
doing the same work in different  industries  should receive roughly  the 
same  pay regardless  of industry  differences  in productivity,  but it is alto- 
gether  unreasonable  to assume  that  the prices  of the products  of industries 
with  different  productivity  trends  should  move  together. 
For the period 1970-75 the average  growth  in output  per production 
worker  hour  in the industries  for which separate  measures  are published 
by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  ranged  from an increase  of 9.2 percent 
in candy  and other  confectionery  products  to a decrease  of 4.8 percent  in 
bituminous  coal and lignite mining.14  An industry  that experiences  no 
change  in productivity  and  has a 6 percent  increase  in wages  will  be forced 
to raise  prices  at close to 6 percent  unless  it uses little labor.  An industry 
whose productivity  is rising at 8 percent should be reducing  product 
prices  unless  its nonlabor  costs are rising  rapidly.  A price-control  agency 
with discretionary  authority  can take such circumstances  into account  to 
12. See Arthur M. Okun, "The Great Stagflation Swamp," Challenge, vol.  20 
(November/December 1977), p. 13. 
13. Ibid. 
14. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Productivity  Indexes for Selected Industries, 
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the extent  that available  data permit,  but it is almost  impossible  to write 
them  into the Internal  Revenue  Code. 
COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING  AND  INDUSTRIAL  DISPUTES 
The proposal  to tax corporations  oln  excessive wage increases  must 
consider  the differences  between  tax units  and  collective  bargaining  units. 
A corporation  might  treat  all its domestic  operations  as one entity  for cor- 
porate  tax purposes,  but within this entity  it might  have many different 
collective  bargaining  units,  often represented  by several  different  unions, 
as well as a large  number  of nonunion  employees. 
Weintraub  attempts  to convert  this problem  into an asset,  in my opin- 
ion unsuccessfully.  He writes, "A not inconsiderable  virtue [of TIP] is 
that unions can bargain  for sums  in excess of the productivity  norm  and 
perhaps  succeed in redistributing  some income from profits  and mana- 
gerial employees."'15  This is a clear statement  of why business  might  op- 
pose TIP. 
Even if the goal of policy were to redistribute  income by differential 
changes in compensation  to  create greater equality, it  could not be 
achieved  by the route  that  Weintraub  suggests.  Nonunion  employees  are 
not all managers.  In most firms,  the majority  of nonunion  employees  are 
clerical  workers,  and they generally  receive lower wages than unionized 
production  workers.  Suppose  that  a firm  had equal  numbers  of union  and 
nonunion  employees,  that the wage norm was 6 percent, and that the 
union  succeeded  in obtaining  a wage  increase  of 8 percent.  To avoid  a tax 
penalty,  the firm  would have to hold its nonunion  employees  to a 4 per- 
cent  wage  increase.  If firms  chose  to do this,  there  would  be an increase  in 
union-nonunion  wage  differentials,  which  are already  large;  many  econo- 
mists  might  say they are  too large.  However,  in my  judgment  few employ- 
ers would  risk  such  a policy.  To provide  nonunion  workers  with  only half 
the wage  increase  of union  workers  would  lower  morale  and perhaps  de- 
crease  productivity  or invite  the unionization  of the nonunion  group.  Most 
firms  would  prefer  to pay the tax penalty.  But if they  did, the effectiveness 
of TIP would be reduced. The unions, however, could and probably 
would  use Weintraub's  argument  as grounds  for not adhering  to the wage 
norm. 
The same kind of problem  arises  when a company  bargains  with two 
unions  of unequal  strength.  If the stronger  union  negotiated  first,  it might 
15. "Incomes Policy: Completing the Stabilization  Triangle,"  p. 119. Albert  Rees  465 
insist on a settlement  in excess of the guideline,  and the employer  would 
have to decide  whether  to pay the tax penalty  or to try to reach  a settle- 
ment below the guideline  with the weaker  union.  However,  the existence 
of a wage guideline  makes  it more  difficult  for a weak union to accept  a 
settlement  below  the guideline. 
The general  strategy  of the Wallich-Weintraub  proposal  is to "stiffen 
the backbone"  of employers  in wage bargaining-that is, to encourage 
employers  to resist excessive  union wage demands.  It seems logical that 
this will increase both the frequency  and the duration  of strikes, and 
the Wallich-Weintraub  analysis  explicitly  suggests  the latter  effect.  In the 
diagram  below, which is a slight simplification  of a similar  one used by 
Wallich  and Weintraub,  the horizontal  axis measures  time, and the verti- 
cal axis measures  the rate of change of money wages. Point D is the 
union's original wage demand, and the line labeled U represents  the 
union's  modification  of its wage demands  through  time.  The line E shows 
the improvement  of the employer's  wage offer  through  time  without  TIP. 
The introduction  of such a policy, with the wage  guideline  established  at 
point G, shifts  the righthand  portion  of the employer's  offer  curve  to ET. 
Without  TIP, settlement  is reached  at point S0  at time To; after  the intro- 
duction  of TIP, settlement  is reached  at point S1  at time T1. Wallich  and 
Weintraub  do not divide their time scale into two segments  representing 
negotiations  before and negotiations  during  a strike.  However,  if a strike 
began before To,  it would be prolonged  by the time between  To and T, 
Presumably  some strikes  would also begin  in this interval. 
Business  and labor  generally  prefer  to avoid  strikes  whenever  possible 
because  of the losses they bring  to both parties.  This aspect  of TIP gives 
them  additional  reason  to oppose  the policy.  Strikes  also impose  losses on 
the general  public,  and  the shortages  that  result  from  them  can  lower  pro- 
ductivity  and  raise  prices. 
In this respect,  TIP is inferior  to wage controls,  which  actually  reduce 
strikes.  Days  idle resulting  from  work  stoppages  were  0. 1  5 percent  of total 
working  time  in 1972 and  0.14 percent  in 1973, the two years  in the past 
decade in which  wage controls  were in effect  throughout  the year. These 
figures  are below those for any other years in this decade,  including  the 
recession  year, 1975. It is easy  to understand  why  controls  deter  strikes- 
there  is not much  point in a union  placing  economic  pressure  on an em- 
ployer  to make  wage concessions  if the government  will not permit  these 
concessions  to go into effect. 
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decline consistently  through  time, although  it is by no means obvious 
that they will. The union may have some minimum  demand  for which 
it is prepared  to bargain  to the point of impasse  or even to strike  for a 
protracted  period. In the diagram  this would be shown by a horizontal 
segment  of U. If this horizontal  segment  began  at or to the left of SO,  TIP 
would increase  the frequency  or length of strikes  without  any reduction 
in the wage increase  at which they were settled.  Wallich  and Weintraub 
recognize  this possibility,  but argue  that a union  that  fails to take account 
of TIP in its demands  is not maximizing  benefits  for its members. 
I know  of no evidence  that industrial  disputes  arise  from  or are settled 
by maximizing  behavior  by both parties,  any more  than are international 
or religious  disputes.  It is not unknown  for a strike  to be settled  for more 
than the union's  original  demand  when a strong  union is determined  to 
teach  management  a lesson and  recoup  some  of the losses suffered  during 
a strike.  When  the union  has the power  to win a long strike,  it does little 
good  to strengthen  management's  backbone.  There  will certainly  be some Albert  Rees  467 
cases in which the TIP guideline  would cause the size of the eventual 
settlement  to be smaller.  But this would not be true of every settlement, 
and  it is an open question  whether  the gains  would  be worth  the costs. 
One advantage  claimed  for TIP is that it is automatic  and thus easy 
to administer.  The opposite  side of this coin is that TIP does not enable 
its administrators  to help in the settlement  of actual  or potential  disputes 
in collective  bargaining  or in the improvement  of collective bargaining 
structures.  There have been cases in which the administration  of wage 
controls  accomplished  this in the past, and this has been one of the miti- 
gating  aspects  of wage-control  programs. 
If TIP does lead to more strikes,  it could also lead to more govern- 
ment  intervention  to settle those strikes.  Such  intervention  usually  brings 
pressure  on management  to offer  more  generous  terms  because  there  may 
be no way in which  the government  can bring  effective  pressure  on union 
members.  The federal government  would then either have to work at 
cross-purposes  with its own TIP or suspend  the TIP to help settle emer- 
gency  disputes. 
ADMINISTRATIVE  PROBLEMS:  WAGES'16 
As I noted earlier,  one of the principal  claims  made  for the TIP pro- 
posals is that they do not involve substantial  administrative  costs. Lau- 
rence Seidman,  in his letter to the New York Times of December  22, 
1976, lists as TIP's  first  advantage  over  controls  that  "no  new  bureaucracy 
is required."  Critics of the TIP proposals  have been skeptical  of this 
claim. Gardner  Ackley has commented,  "From  my experience  in design- 
ing and administering  price controls  during  World  War  II, and again,  in 
a policy  role, during  the Korean  War,  I retain  keen, and  sometimes  bitter, 
memories  of great  ideas about  ways to restrain  wage and price  increases 
for which  the fine  print  could never  be written-or  if it could be written, 
filled endless volumes of the Federal Register with constant  revisions, 
exceptions, and adjustments  necessary  to cover special situations  that 
could never have been dreamed  of in advance  by the most imaginative 
economists,  accountants,  and lawyers."17  This section explores  the basis 
for these  diverging  views. 
16. Some of the problems raised in this and the following section are considered 
in more detail in the paper in this volume by Larry L. Dildine and Emil M. Sunley. 
17. Gardner Ackley, "Okun's  New Tax-Based Incomes-Policy Proposal," Eco- 
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The difficulty  of administering  wage  guidelines  depends  in part  on how 
increases  in compensation  are  defined.  Originally,  Wallich  and  Weintraub 
proposed  four possibilities:  (1) total wages,  salaries,  bonuses,  and  fringe 
benefits  divided  by the number  of employees  on a given date; (2)  total 
wage and related  payments  divided  by the daily average  number  of em- 
ployees;  (3) total wage and  related  payments  divided  by employee  hours 
worked  (that is, compensation  per employee  hour); and (4)  total wage 
and  related  payments  in each job classification  and grade  divided  by the 
number  of man-hours  worked,  combined  into a weighted  index of wage 
increases."' 
Wallich  and  Weintraub  recognized  that  the  first  three  of these  proposals 
were subject  to possible  manipulation  by the employer  or could result  in 
windfall  gains and losses through  changes  in the skill mix. For example, 
an employer  could increase  wages by more than the guideline  in every 
occupation,  yet escape penalty  taxes because  employment  or hours had 
increased  most in the low-paid occupations.  By March 1972, Wallich 
was  writing  that  these  proposals  "probably  will not do at all."19  Yet Wal- 
lich and Weintraub  also recognize  that the fourth  proposal  involves  sub- 
stantial  difficulties  of computation  for large firms  with many establish- 
ments and hundreds  of different  job titles. Firms  do not now ordinarily 
maintain  weighted  indexes of wage increases,  and even the Bureau of 
Labor  Statistics  has only begun  such  an index  in the past  decade.  Average 
hourly  earnings  are easily obtained  by accountants  from  payroll  records; 
weighted  indexes of wage changes must be computed  by statisticians. 
Neither  the typical  corporate  employer  nor the Internal  Revenue  Service 
has the capabilities  of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  in this area.  Speci- 
fying the proper computation  of a weighted  index of compensation  in- 
creases  in TIP is a task  that  gives rise  to the kind  of fears  that  Ackley has 
expressed. 
An area  of difficulty  in the administration  of wage  controls  that  would 
also be present  in TIP is the treatment  of fringe  benefits.  Costs of fringe 
benefits are easy to compute when employers  make contributions  of 
cents per hour to a benefit  fund, as they do in the construction  industry. 
They  are  difficult  to estimate,  however,  when  a collective  bargaining  agree- 
ment  or an employer  benefit  plan specifies  future  pension  or health  bene- 
18. Condensed from "A Tax-Based Incomes Policy," pp. 13-14. 
19. Henry C. Wallich, "Phase II and the Proposal for a Tax-Oriented  Incomes 
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fits rather  than current  contributions.  Translating  such benefits  into cur- 
rent costs requires complicated calculations about which competent 
actuaries  can disagree.  The Internal  Revenue  Service  already  faces these 
difficulties  in auditing  employer  costs of fringe benefits  claimed  on tax 
retums. 
Past  wage-control  programs  have  controlled  benefits  more  loosely  than 
wages  and salaries.  This can be justified  if fringe  benefits  are believed  to 
be too low as a proportion  of total compensation,  which  may have been 
true  during  World  War  II and the Korean  War.  It could also be justified 
during  a demand-pull  inflation  on the ground  that future  pensions  and 
health benefits,  unlike current  wages,  do not add to aggregate  demand. 
However,  the theory underlying  TIP assumes  that the problem  is cost- 
push, not demand-pull  inflation.  To be consistent  with this theory,  TIP 
advocates  must fully include  fringe  benefits  in their compensation  mea- 
sure. 
The costs of fringe  benefits  can rise not only because  benefit  levels are 
improved,  but also because  inflation  raises  the cost of maintaining  exist- 
ing benefit  levels. Such  increased  costs  have  been exempted  from  previous 
wage-control  programs,  but it is not at all clear that this could be per- 
mitted  in a future  incomes  policy  without  seriously  weakening  the  policy.20 
Another  area of administrative  difficulty  is the implementation  of in- 
centive pay programs.  In most of these programs,  an increase  in pay 
resulting  from higher  output  would nevertheless  reduce  unit labor costs. 
Because  the main  purpose  of TIP is to contain  the cost of labor  per unit, 
this suggests  that increases  in amounts  received  as incentive  pay under 
existing  schemes  should  be excluded  from  the  proposed  wage  index.  How- 
ever,  past wage-control  programs  have regulated  the introduction  of new 
incentive pay schemes on the ground that a large loophole might be 
created if regulations  were absent. Special consideration  needs to be 
given to incentive  programs  for executives  based on corporate  and divi- 
sional profits  rather  than on output.  None of these problems  is by any 
means  insurmountable,  but addressing  them  requires  regulations  and ad- 
ministrative  machinery. 
The negotiation  of cost-of-living  escalator  provisions  will create an 
area  of increased  uncertainty  for management  under  TIP;  more  than  half 
20. For an elaboration  of this view, see Daniel Quinn Mills, Government,  Labor, 
and Inflation: Wage Stabilization  in the United States (University of Chicago Press, 
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of all major collective bargaining  agreements  now contain such provi- 
sions. Any tax penalties  arising  from escalator  provisions  can be levied 
after  the fact on the basis of wages actually  paid. When  negotiating  the 
agreement,  management  must predict the future rate of inflation,  as it 
does now. However,  the possibility  of a tax penalty  will increase  the cost 
of underprediction.  This could restrain  the spread  of escalator  provisions, 
but those managements  already  using them will not welcome  the added 
risk. 
Attention  must  also be paid to problems  of wage  inequities.  During  the 
wage-control  program  of 1971-74, the base date for calculating  wage 
increases was November 14,  1971. Collective bargaining  agreements 
reached  before that date were allowed to operate as negotiated  unless 
challenged.  Those reached  afterward  required  approval  if they exceeded 
the pay standard,  and  were  often cut back.  Situations  then  arose  in which 
two groups  of workers  in the same  local union  who had always  received 
the same  wage  rate  would  have different  rates  because  one employer  had 
signed  an agreement  on November  13 and another  had signed  an identi- 
cal agreement  on November 15; such differences  created great unrest 
among union members  and strong  political pressures  on union leaders. 
Some  of these  inequities  were  later  remedied  by awards  of retroactive  pay 
to the aggrieved  workers.  This solution  was most distasteful  to manage- 
ment,  which  had not included  the originally  disallowed  wage  increases  in 
prices,  and viewed  retroactive  payments  as impinging  directly  on the bot- 
tom line of the profit  and  loss statement. 
From a union's  viewpoint,  TIP is preferable  to controls  in preventing 
wage  inequities  from  arising  when  the  program  is first  instituted.  By actual 
or threatened  strikes,  unions  could compel most managements  to follow 
the traditional  patterns  established  in previously  negotiated  settlements, 
even at the cost of tax penalties.  However,  the inequity  is shifted  to the 
firm:  the employer  who follows patterns  pays penalty  taxes;  the one who 
sets patterns  does not. Again, regulations  could be written  and admin- 
istered  to address  such problems,  but not without  the usual  bureaucratic 
costs. 
Multiyear  agreements  negotiated  before the inauguration  of a TIP 
give rise to a problem  even if they do not cause  wage inequities.  If wage 
increases  in the second and third years of such agreements  exceed the 
guideline,  employers  could be liable for tax penalties  that were unantici- 
pated  when they entered  into the agreements.  To avoid this effect,  prior Albert  Rees  471 
agreements  could be exempted  from TIP, but this would mean that TIP 
would  need  three  years  to become  fully  effective. 
Not all distortion  in wage structure  arises  from the operation  of in- 
comes  policies.  Some comes from  the sequential  nature  of collective  bar- 
gaining  and wage determination  in the private  sector. Wage settlements 
elsewhere  and changes  in labor market  conditions  can create situations 
in which some wages in a firm  are inequitably  low or are different  from 
prevailing  rates in the area or industry.  Wage-control  programs  have 
always  included  provisions  for dealing  with such  inequity  problems,  usu- 
ally administered  by staff with experience  in industrial  relations.  Such 
exceptions  are  less necessary  under  TIP than  under  wage  controls  because 
an employer  can remedy  inequities  and pay the tax penalty  without  ob- 
taining  previous  permission  and without violating  the law. However,  if 
no exceptions  were permitted,  some employers  would probably  pay tax 
penalties  resulting  from  circumstances  essentially  beyond  their  control. 
The most difficult  question  for unions  in past wage-control  programs 
has been whether  or not to participate  in the administration  of the pro- 
gram.  If union leaders  did not participate,  they feared  that the program 
would  be administered  in ways that  were adverse  to the interests  of their 
members.  If they did participate,  they could  be criticized  by rivals  within 
the union for holding  wages down when they were being paid to raise 
them.  The resulting  ambivalence  is shown  by the several  cases in which 
union  leaders  have walked  out of wage stabilization  boards-and  some- 
times  have been persuaded  to return  by changes  in the program.  The best 
option that union leaders  have at present  is to try to prevent  TIP from 
going  into effect. 
The threats  to incumbent  union leaders  from rivals within  their own 
unions have increased  greatly  in both frequency  and force since the en- 
actment  of the Landrum-Griffin  act in 1959. It is public  policy, and  in my 
view correct  public  policy,  to encourage  democracy  in trade  unions.  How- 
ever,  one disadvantage  of the act is that  it makes  labor  leaders  less willing 
to cooperate,  in the name  of the "public  interest,"  when  economic  policies 
are adverse  to the interests  of their  members. 
The most difficult  union attitude  to predict  is the reaction  to possible 
tax incentives  payable  to workers  when  wage  settlements  are  below  guide- 
lines. This carrot  approach  to the TIP proposal  can substitute  tax benefits 
for wage  benefits  won by a union.  Although  the individual  worker  may  be 
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tion and  do not win support  for union  leaders.  For this reason,  if support 
of such a plan were voluntary,  I would expect that many unions  would 
not participate. 
ADMINISTRATIVE  PROBLEMS:  PRICES 
The Okun  proposal  is less explicit  on the price  side than  is the Wallich- 
Weintraub  proposal.  In general,  Okun  proposes  that  each  firm  would  have 
to maintain  a price  index for its domestic  products.  Many  large  firms  do 
so now for internal  use, though  the methods  used must  be far from uni- 
form and would have to be prescribed.  However,  the problems  of con- 
structing  adequate  price  indexes  are far more difficult  than those of con- 
structing  adequate  wage  indexes.  Most of these  problems  are  well known, 
and need only to be mentioned  briefly.  Regulations  would be needed to 
specify  how to handle  changes  in discounts,  delivery  charges,  extras,  and 
similar  components  of the final price to the buyer.  For some products, 
such as clothing,  problems  would arise from changes  in style. In other 
cases, such as computers,  there  would be problems  of measuring  quality 
change.  Indeed, computers  are currently  not included  in the wholesale 
price  index. 
All the difficulties  of devising  useful price  indexes are now dealt with 
by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  in the computation  of the consumer  and 
the wholesale  price indexes, which is to say that they are generally  not 
insuperable,  although  few corporations  have the statistical  competence 
and  resources  of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  Moreover,  in the absence 
of a TIP or a price  control  program,  differences  of opinion  about  how to 
measure  prices will not generally  give rise to judicial  or administrative 
proceedings;  if TIP were  in effect,  they undoubtedly  would. 
The agencies  that administered  price controls  had great  discretion  to 
omit some products  from control  by regulation  if they did not seem  to be 
important  contributors  to price increases.  This probably  could not be 
done in a TIP that depends  on the average  price increase  of a corpora- 
tion's  products.  If exceptions  were not possible,  the program  would  have 
broader  price  coverage  than  that  of past control  programs. 
The Okun proposal  also calls for a "dollar-and-cents  pass-through" 
of any increases  in costs of materials  and supplies.  This would again  en- 
tail additional  recordkeeping  if firms  did not maintain  separate  aggregate 
measures  of the quantity  and price  of materials  purchased.  However,  the Albert  Rees  473 
administrative  problems  are small compared  to the inequities  mentioned 
earlier  arising  from  the application  of uniform  price  guidelines  in the face 
of sharply  divergent  productivity  trends among industries.  The answer 
might  be different  price guidelines  at the industry  level, at least where 
there  are  adequate  industry  measures  of productivity,  but again  this could 
not be done  without  administrative  machinery. 
The claim that TIP requires  no new bureaucracy  may be true in the 
sense that it would not require  a new government  agency.  However,  it 
might  require  the Internal  Revenue  Service  to expand  its staff  and to re- 
cruit  personnel  with  the skills  of those at such  agencies  as the former  Cost 
of Living  Council. 
One important  reason for the strong  opposition  of business  to wage 
and price controls is that the administrative  problems  they created  ab- 
sorbed  much of the time of corporate  officers  and required  large addi- 
tional expenditures  on legal and accounting  services,  both internal  and 
external.  TIP would probably  have similar  costs. It is entirely  legitimate 
for TIP proponents  to argue  that the benefits  would exceed these costs, 
but  it is unconvincing  to pretend  that  the costs would  not exist. 
Deregulation 
The third  nontraditional  way in which economists  have recently  pro- 
posed to fight inflation  is to repeal or modify some government  regula- 
tions that raise prices or increase  costs without creating  corresponding 
benefits.  A modest  program  to seek  such  changes  in regulation  was  enacted 
as part  of the Council  on Wage  and Price Stability  Act of 1974 and has 
been  in effect  for more than three  years. However,  the success of these 
efforts  has  been  limited. 
Cost-reducing  changes  in regulations,  like cuts in excise taxes, should 
have a one-time  effect  in lowering  the price level, with gradually  dimin- 
ishing  effects  on the subsequent  rate of change.  Such regulatory  reform 
has wide support  among  economists:  those economists  who believe that 
inflation  is largely  or entirely  a monetary  phenomenon  support  deregula- 
tion because  it would improve  the allocation  of resources  or reduce  un- 
necessary  government  intervention  in the economy. 
The business  and labor  view of deregulation  differs  sharply  from case 
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gain and  groups  that  lose among  business  firms  and employees.  To iden- 
tify these  gainers  and  losers  it is useful  to distinguish  two major  styles of 
regulation,  which  I call old and  new. 
OLD-STYLE  REGULATION 
By old-style  regulation,  I mean the kind of regulation  exemplified  by 
the Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  which  has broad  power  to set rates 
or prices  and  control  the entry  of firms  in a sharply  limited  industry  or set 
of industries.  Many of the agencies  that make and administer  such regu- 
lations are independent  commissions  outside the cabinet departments. 
With a few notable exceptions,  the general  effect of this regulation  has 
been  to set prices  or rates  higher  than  they  would  have  been  without  regu- 
lation and to limit entry  into the regulated  industries.  In such cases, re- 
laxing the regulation  generally  tends to lower prices or rates and to in- 
crease  the quantity  of the service  supplied. 
Proposals  for deregulation  can be expected  to have a mixed  reception 
by business,  depending  on how a particular  enterprise  is affected.  A few 
examples  will make  the conflict  of interests  apparent. 
Some provisions  of the 1936 Robinson-Patman  act, administered  by 
the Federal  Trade  Commission,  and certain  regulations  of the Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  prevent  private  carriers  of freight  from  achieving 
cost savings  by carrying  freight  on return  trips, or backhauls.21  For ex- 
ample,  retailers  and  wholesalers  of food would  like to have these restric- 
tions on backhauls  removed  so that when they make deliveries  to food 
stores  they can save freight  charges  by using their own empty  trucks  to 
bring  back  to the warehouse  products  manufactured  near  the destination 
of the delivery. They understandably  complain that empty backhauls 
waste  resources  and raise costs. Their efforts  are vigorously  opposed  by 
the certificated  common  carriers,  who would lose revenue  traffic  if the 
restrictions  were  lifted.  These efforts  at deregulation  are also opposed  by 
some manufacturers  of brand-name  grocery  products  who prefer  to sell 
at  delivered  prices. 
In this case, the union  representing  the affected  workers  (International 
Brotherhood  of Teamsters) represents  drivers  for both private  carriers 
21. Private carriers are truck fleets owned or leased by companies that are not 
certificated  common carriers; these trucks carry goods belonging to the company 
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and common  carriers  and thus may not have a large stake in the out- 
come.  However,  the union cannot  be expected  to support  a proposal  that 
might  reduce  the total employment  of its members. 
Regulated  passenger  airlines  offer another  example  of a division be- 
tween  firms  now protected  and  those  excluded  from  regulation.  For many 
years  all domestic,  regulated  carriers  opposed  deregulation,  as did the Air 
Line Pilots Association.  Commuter  airlines  and charter  flight  operators 
favored  it, presumably  because  it would  give them  access  to markets  from 
which  they are now excluded.22  Recently  some reductions  in airline  fares 
have been taking  place under  regulation.  This reflects  both the pressures 
created  by proposed changes  in legislation  and the appointment  of two 
economists  to membership  on the Civil Aeronautics  Board. 
Domestic interstate  natural  gas is a leading case in which industry- 
specific  regulation  has  kept  prices  below  the level that  would  exist  without 
regulation.  In this case, it is the protected  industry  that seeks deregula- 
tion, and the consumer  groups that oppose it. Unions generally  view 
deregulation  of natural  gas from  the standpoint  of their  members  as con- 
sumers. Deregulation  of natural gas would raise price indexes in the 
short  run, but could lower them eventually  if the supply  response  were 
sufficient  to reduce  the need to import  natural  gas. 
The events of the last few years suggest  that some improvement  can 
be made  in those aspects  of old-style  regulation  that  raise  prices  and  costs, 
but progress  will come slowly. Regulation  that has substantial  effects 
creates  large  benefits  for some segments  of the economy.  Those segments 
that  receive  benefits  will naturally  fight  harder  to preserve  regulation  than 
the diffuse  losers  will fight  to reform  it. 
NEW-STYLE  REGULATION 
New-style  regulation,  as exemplified  by such agencies  as the Environ- 
mental  Protection  Agency, tends to have a narrow  focus of concern  but 
a broad  coverage  of industries.  Other  examples  include  the Occupational 
22. Among the many anomalies of  present airline regulation, I note here that 
United Airlines is required to serve the eastern Nevada towns of Elko and Ely. In 
1970, Elko had a population of 7,621 and Ely 4,176. These locations are served by 
the smallest  plane in the United Airline fleet, a Boeing 737 jet. For a recent discussion 
of some of the issues raised by air passenger  regulation, see Paul W. MacAvoy and 
John W. Snow, eds., Regulation of  Passenger Fares and Competition1  among the 
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Safety and Health Administration,  the Consumer  Product  Safety Com- 
mission,  and (with somewhat  narrower  industry  coverage) the National 
Highway  Traffic  Safety Administration.  Many such agencies  are within 
cabinet  departments. 
There are many instances  in which the costs of new-style  regulation 
seem to exceed their benefits,  or where the benefits  are not obtained  in 
the least costly way. Again, the reactions  of industry  and labor to pro- 
posals to reduce  the cost of regulation  depend  largely  on the particular 
regulation  in question.  The automobile  industry  and the United Auto- 
mobile Workers  have joined in opposing certain costly motor vehicle 
emission  standards.  The automobile  industry  has opposed  the mandatory 
use of air  bags  to protect  the occupants  of automobiles  in accidents,  while 
the casualty  insurance  industry  has favored  it. Industry  frequently  criti- 
cizes OSHA  regulations  for being  too costly,  while  labor  may  criticize  the 
same  regulations  for being  too lax. 
There is little general  understanding  of economists'  approach  to such 
questions  through  benefit-cost  analysis.  The public and legislators  fre- 
quently  argue  that life, health, and safety are priceless,  and that no cost 
is too high to pay for them. This is, of course, nonsense,  but appealing 
nonsense.  Decisions are made everyday  that implicitly  place a less than 
infinite  value on life and health-for  example,  in permitting  the use of 
cigarettes  or in constructing  a two-lane  rather  than a four-lane  highway. 
However,  opposition  to the excessive  cost of some new-style  regulation 
is easily  depicted  as opposition  to its worthy  purposes. 
Better economic analysis  could perhaps  reduce the cost of new-style 
regulation  without  sacrificing  desirable  objectives.  Nevertheless,  the ag- 
gregate  costs of such regulation  and its effects on measured  prices will 
probably  continue  to rise.  Perhaps  the most that can  be accomplished  is a 
deceleration  of the rate  of increase. 
Concluding  Comments 
If business  and labor oppose some of the new proposals  for fighting 
inflation,  particularly  the TIP proposals,  it is proper  to ask whether  they 
would  prefer  the alternatives.  This is not a question  they will be eager  to 
answer;  it is similar  to asking  whether  one prefers  to die by shooting  or by 
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It seems  clear  that labor  would  prefer  TIP to wage and  price  controls, 
especially  if TIP covered  prices. Wage controls  are a binding  constraint 
on wages,  and unions  may pay part of the penalties  for deliberate  viola- 
tion of them.  In contrast,  strong  unions might  feel confident  that under 
TIP they  could  exert  influence  through  militant  strikes,  and  that manage- 
ment would take the consequences.  By the same token, management 
might  choose wage and price controls  as the lesser evil because  in return 
for their costs they might effectively  restrain  strong  unions. 
Both unions and management  might prefer  the use of monetary  and 
fiscal  policy to either  TIP or controls.  A probable  exception  on both sides 
of the  bargaining  table  is the construction  industry  and  its suppliers,  which 
under present institutional  arrangements  in financial  markets  are par- 
ticularly  vulnerable  to increases  in interest  rates. 
The labor  movement  is on record  as being  opposed  to tight  money  and 
high  interest  rates  and  as favoring  an expansionary  fiscal  policy.  But these 
policies do not impinge  as directly  as TIP on the central  function  of the 
trade  union, which is wage determination.  Moreover,  labor's  view is less 
crucial  to the outcome  in this area  because  the use of monetary  and  fiscal 
policy  does not require  new  legislation. 
Management  would clearly  favor  the use of tighter  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies. Although  management  is now generally  willing to concede the 
need for budget  deficits  in a recession,  it would prefer  the budget  to be 
balanced  over the full business  cycle and strongly  questions  the need for 
large  deficits  in the third  year  of a recovery. 
Business  support  for tight  monetary  policy rests  both on opposition  to 
inflation  and on acceptance  of monetarist  rather  than Keynesian  macro- 
economic  theory.  An analysis  of the reasons  for these views  is beyond  the 
scope of this paper,  but their strength  is not open to question.  One ele- 
ment of the explanation  may be that business  believes neither  that the 
economy  is far from full employment  at present,  nor that there are now 
large gains  in output  to be achieved  from increased  monetary  and fiscal 
stimulus.  Keynes  did not persuade  the business  community  to abandon 
the old-time  religion,  and  I doubt  that  Wallich  and  Weintraub  will be any 
more  successful. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Daniel J. B. Mitchell: The Rees paper  reviews  a variety  of policies that 
might  be used to fight  inflation.  Although  he does not state it explicitly, 
Rees implies that fighting  inflation  will have to be done-if  it is to be 
done  at all-through traditional  demand-restraining  measures.  In particu- 
lar, he concludes  that tax-based  incomes  policies are currently  unaccept- 
able to either  labor or management.  Moreover,  they are administratively 
complex  and possibly  unworkable.  Rees does not provide  a statement  of 
his views on the efficacy  of the traditional  demand-restraint  approach; 
that is not the topic of his paper.  But I doubt  that he would expect  mir- 
acles in the next year  or two from  monetaly  and  fiscal  policies.  So I must 
take  this interesting  paper  to be essentially  pessimistic  on the prospect  of 
achieving  much  on the  inflation  front. 
Rees weighs  various  pros and cons of the TIPs and other recent  pro- 
posals.  Much of his criticism  is on administrative  grounds.  But the paper 
does not include  an explicit  statement  of the assumed  sources  of the cur- 
rent inflation  or, at least, the reasons  for its perpetuation.  At present,  a 
justification  for a TIP would probably  include  some reference  to institu- 
tional  factors  or inflationary  expectations-especially in the labor  market 
-which  maintain  the momentum  of inflation.  George Perry's  paper in 
this  volume  develops  this  kind  of prognosis  of the current  inflation.  If you 
do not accept  such a diagnosis,  you probably  do not view TIP as a cure. 
If the diagnosis  is accepted,  however,  some of Rees' conclusions  might 
be altered.  For example,  reductions  in excise taxes are characterized  as 
"one-shot"  affairs.  Rees qualifies  this characterization  by adding that 
there  might  be secondary  effects  but that these effects  diminish  and even- 
tually  fade. The key issue is whether  or not the rate of inflation  is lower 
after  the absolute  price level effects  have worked  through  the economy. 
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In some views of the momentum  of inflation,  it is possible  that a perma- 
nent  reduction  in inflation  could  be made  by a coordinated  series  of seem- 
ingly one-shot  policies. Much depends  on packaging.  A cut in an excise 
tax might  be put forward  as a minor  technical  fiscal adjustment.  Or, al- 
ternatively,  such cuts might  be presented  as part of an overall  anti-infla- 
tion program.  If the latter  could  be made  convincing,  the rate  of inflation 
might  be permanently  lowered,  either  by affecting  expectations  or by in- 
fluencing  other aspects of the wage-price  setting  process that might be 
responsible  for the  momentum  of inflation. 
The same  can  be said  for the type  of interventions  in the federal  regula- 
tory process that the Council  on Wage and Price Stability  regularly  at- 
tempts.  Taken  one at a time, a tilt at the Occupational  Safety  and  Health 
Administration  or at the Civil  Aeronautics  Board  will have little percep- 
tible  impact  on inflation,  although  these  interventions  might  be justified  on 
resource  allocation  grounds. (Such tilting does have the advantage  of 
keeping  the council  in business  when fighting  inflation  is not in vogue.) 
But as part  of a publicized  anti-inflation  package,  the impact  on inflation 
could be more lasting. Indeed, I had always assumed  that the council, 
under Rees' initial direction,  had something  like this in mind when it 
launched  its activities  in 1974. 
Because much of the fault Rees finds with TIP proposals  is directed 
toward  administrative  considerations  rather  than the theory  of inflation, 
most of my remarks  will focus on the administrative  issue. His basic 
position-one  with which I am totally in accord-is  that in many ways 
a TIP would be no simpler  to operate  than a formal controls  program. 
All the problems  of costing,  base periods,  unforeseen  effects, and so on 
associated  with controls arise under TIP. The advocates  of TIPs have 
often underestimated  the inherent  complexities,  and it is useful for Rees 
to point  these out. In effect,  Rees tells us that  the choice  between controls 
(formal or informal) and TIP should not be made on the assumption 
that TIP will be simple to administer.  But there are other grounds  for 
favoring  TIP over  controls. 
TIPs are said to avoid or minimize  two important  drawbacks  of con- 
trols. First, in the labor market,  controls  invite confrontations  between 
unions and government  authorities  when specific,  newly negotiated  con- 
tracts  are  reviewed.  Such  confrontations  can  discredit  a policy  if the guide- 
lines are  openly  flaunted  (as in the example  of President  Johnson  and  the 
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deceleration  and coal intervention).  Second,  controls  can create  "distor- 
tions"  of misallocation  and shortages,  primarily  in the product  market. 
TIPs leave collective  bargaining  to the parties,  thus avoiding  direct  gov- 
ernment  involvement  and reducing  the risk of confrontation.  And the 
product-market  misallocation  that might be created  is likely to be less 
severe  under  TIP than  under  rigid  pricing  rules  or ceilings.  Rees does not 
seem  impressed  by these arguments,  but they make  sense  to me. 
Although  I agree  that  controls  and  TIPs  involve  similar  administrative 
problems,  I believe  the Rees paper  overestimates  the complexity  of these 
problems.  Consider  the  issue  of establishing  guidelines.  Rees takes  us over 
the familiar  ground  of productivity-based  guidelines  and the usual arith- 
metic that wage changes  equal productivity  plus inflation.  Productivity 
plus  inflation  has been a convenient  rationale  for justifying  the wage goal 
of past policies.  But the rationale  is not that important.  Indeed,  the goal 
and  the guideline  need not be synonymous.  Much depends  on the nature 
of the policy. If a controls  policy permits  few exceptions  or a TIP policy 
imposes  stringent  penalties,  the guideline  must be higher  than the goal. 
The more  liberal  the program,  the closer  the guideline  is to the goal. 
An explicit  productivity  guideline,  as Rees notes, raises  the specter  of 
a "frozen"  income  distribution.  But such  fears are exaggerated.  The pur- 
pose of incomes  policies,  tax-based  or otherwise,  is not the redistribution 
of income-despite the misleadinig  nomenclature-but rather  the reduc- 
tion of cost increases.'  The goal and guideline  should  be set high enough 
to be realistic,  but low enough to reduce  inflationary  expectations.  If a 
productivity  rationale  confuses  the issue, then deceleration  or some other 
rationale  can  be offered.2 
1. The term "incomes  policy" began to be used in Britain in the early 1960s for 
several reasons. First, it was more politically appealing than "wages policy," the 
earlier  term. Second, the British  were beginning  to flirt with economic planning,  and 
the notion of planning incomes seemed enticing. Third, in Britain and elsewhere in 
Europe,  the view that inflation  results from deficient  saving propensities  of the work- 
ing class relative to capitalists is popular with both left-wing and right-wing  obser- 
vers. Hence, incomes rather than costs are often seen as the target of  a controls 
policy. 
2.  As long as setting guidelines is viewed as an art rather than as a science, the 
inflexibility  of a numerical guiideline  cited by Rees need not occur. The 5.5 percent 
guideline of the 1971-74 program, although rationalized along the lines of produc- 
tivity plus inflation, was the result of a bargaining  process at the Pay Board. It re- 
mained inflexible after Phase II simply because the new authorities chose to de- 
emphasize  the guideline approach altogether; to  change the guideline would have 
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Probably  the most  important  arguments  Rees raises  on the administra- 
tive side  are  in the area  of industrial  relations.  He points  out that  bargain- 
ing units  are  not the same  as tax units.  A bargaining  unit  may  be a part  of 
a larger  tax unit (for example, unionized  blue-collar  workers  but not 
white-collar  workers) or it may be composed  of many tax units (multi- 
employer  bargaining  and pattern-following  situations).  Variations  in the 
occupational  and age structure  among  firms  in a multiemployer  unit may 
lead  to different  cost and  tax consequences  under  TIP. 
I think  the uniit  problem  is a strong  anti-TIP  argument.  But there  is an- 
other  side that should  be noted. Traditional  monetary  and fiscal  policies 
may also have differential  consequences  for firms  in a multiple-employer 
bargaining  unit  or pattern.  When  faced  with  economic  pressures  and  tech- 
nical  change,  bargaining  units  sometimes  dissolve,  as occurred  in the glass 
industry  in the 1950s. The differential  pressures  on members  of bargain- 
ing units may lead to divergent  treatment  without  destroying  industrial 
relations.  (American  Motors  received  concessions  from  the Autoworkers 
as did Studebaker  before  it.) VVhen  there  are  multiple  wage-determination 
units within a firm, the different  units are always competing  with each 
other  to some  extent  for their  relative  shares.  A TIP may  exacerbate  these 
problems,  but  it does  not create  them. 
Rees also points to industrial  disputes  as a potential  problem  of TIP. 
Stiffening  the backbone of management,  he notes, might cause more 
strikes.  In some versions  of Arthur  Okun's  reward  TIPs, this would not 
be an issue. But even under  penalty  TIPs,  whether  or not this tendency  is 
thought  to be significant  depends  on the model of the bargaining  process 
that  is applied.  On the one hand,  if strikes  are  brought  about  by collisions 
of inflexible  and incompatible  demands,  anything  that widens  the spread 
between  labor and management  will cause more strikes.  On the other 
hand,  if strikes  are the results  of mistaken  judgment  about  the points of 
resistance  of the other  party,  the tendency  of TIP to increase  strikes  need 
not be pronounced.  It is likely, however,  that whatever  the true effect 
might  be, strikes  that lead to significant  public inconvenience  would be 
blamed  on the  program. 
I am puzzled by Rees' insistence  that the proponents  of TIPs must 
inherently  believe that unions maximize  some specific  goal in negotia- 
tions.3  All that is assumed  by TIP advocates  is that management  resis- 
3. Rees is critical of the Wallich-Weintraub  diagram that shows labor and man- 
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tance plays a role in bargaining  outcomes.  If bargaining  were simply a 
process  by which  unions  put forth nonnegotiable  demands  and manage- 
ment had to accede,  wages would be high indeed, and strikes  would be 
nonexistent.  Rees states  that there  will be cases in which the TIP guide- 
lines would cause the size of the eventual  settlement  to be smaller.  Are 
TIP  proponents  really  assuming  anything  other  than  that? 
Finally,  Rees' overall  conclusion  that  neither  labor  nor management  is 
likely  to favor either  controls  or a TIP is not surprising  given recent  his- 
tory. But neither  is it decisive.  Both parties  have had the recent experi- 
ence of controls,  and found  it distasteful.  To the extent  that  the TIP pro- 
posal is known outside the narrow  world of economic academia  and 
Washington  policymakers,  it is undoubtedly  seen as another  form  of con- 
trols. Yet it is apparent  from  the 1971-74 experience  that such attitudes 
are not irrevocably  fixed. In early 1971, organized  business  promoted 
controls,  and organized  labor  was at least unopposed  to the notion.  Even 
after the labor walkout from the Pay Board in early 1972, AFL-CIO 
President  Meany  said that labor  would  learn  to live with the regulations. 
In late 1972, when the shift to Phase III was under debate, organized 
business  did not support  rapid  decontrol.  It was during  1973-74, when 
the authorities  persisted  in trying  to hold back the tide started  by the 
food and oil price increases,  that the opposition  of business and labor 
hardened. 
Both formal controls and the TIP proposals require congressional 
action.  Congressional  debate  would have a destabilizing  effect  on wages 
and  prices.  The TIP proposal,  in addition,  would  put an added  burden  on 
an already  complex  tax system.  For those reasons,  I share  Rees' doubts 
about  the  various  TIP  proposals,  even  apart  from  the administrative  issues 
he raises.  But I am  not persuaded,  as he seems  to be, that  attitudes  toward 
all forms  of direct  intervention  cannot  be changed.  In particular,  I am not 
certain  that the prospect  of another  recession  would not be a powerful 
factor  in stimula-ing  a rethinking  cotncerniing  some sort oL social compact 
on the part of organiized  labor. The fact that management  readily sup- 
ports  demand  restraint  could well encourage  union  leaders  to reconsider 
the  alternatives. 
tions of the parties in particular negotiations anid  come up with cturves  that look 
soniething  like that diagram, although they are not as linear. Of course, it is impos- 
sible to record the "true"  goals of the parties as opposed to the "feelers"  they extend. 
See Roger L. Bowlby and William R. Schriver, "Bluffing  and the 'Split-the-Differ- 
ence' Theory of Wage Bargaining,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations Review, vol. 31 
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Lloyd Ulman: In principle,  incomes policies may be divided  into two 
categories:  those that restrain  wages directly  and prices indirectly,  and 
those that restrain  prices directly  and wages indirectly.  (In practice,  of 
course,  most  policies  contain  elements  of both types.) Each type  of policy 
has often been accompanied  in recent  years by compensatory  modifica- 
tions of tax policy. Policies of direct  wage restraint  have been combined 
with reductions  in income or excise taxes to compensate  wage earners 
for gains forgone under collective bargaining;  and price controls have 
been accompanied  by reductions  in various  types  of business  taxes or by 
extension of subsidies to protect profits and investment,  to minimize 
industrial  strife  due  to stiffened  employer  resistance,  or both. 
Incomes  policies of both types  have entailed  economic  or social costs 
that have limited  their effectiveness,  either  by weakening  compliance  by 
the parties  at whom  they  have  been directed  or by weakening  the political 
will of the community  to enforce or even to introduce  them. Economic 
costs  involve  misallocation  and  other  types  of inefficiency  and,  ultimately, 
slower  growth  rates. Social or political costs result from abridged  free- 
dom, where the policies are in fact backed by legal sanctions.  Across- 
the-board  tax reductions  may prove to be inefficient  incentives  to wage 
restraint  (and hence inadequate  substitutes  for legal sanctions) because 
they are not conditioned  on compliance  in each wage-determining  situa- 
tion.  And if direct  policies  of wage  restraint  are  to be effective,  they  would 
remove  from the unions  a great  part  of their  raison  d'etre (a greater  part 
than  private  enterprise  would  lose from  price  controls). 
The case for tax-oriented  incomes  policies is that they are free of the 
defects  of other  types  of incomes  policy, and, consequently,  that they are 
inherently  more  efficient  in improving  the inflation-unemployment  trade- 
off. They presume  an inducement-negative or positive-to  restrain  at 
the least centralized  levels of wage determination  as well as at the most 
centralized  ones. (This minimizes  the probability  that restraint  exercised 
at formal,  centralized  negotiations  would be neutralized  by greater  wage 
drift  at the plant  level, which is what allegedly  occurred  in Sweden  after 
a reduction  in income  taxes in 1975.) The unions  would not be stripped 
of their  wage-bargaining  function  because  they and the employers  would 
be legally  free  to bargain  for increases  above  the norm  if it were  profitable 
to incur the tax penalty or forgo the tax benefit  for doing so. For the 
same  reason,  there  is no abridgment  of economic  freedom.  Nor would  the 
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if compliance  would cause them,  the employer  would have the incentive 
and the freedom  to disregard  the wage norm.  TIP, in short,  would be at 
once  less restrictive  and  arbitrary  and  more  effective  than  controls. 
"Spinach!"  cries Professor  Rees, whose task it is to anticipate  and 
evaluate  the reactions  of unions and of employers.  He is led to the view 
that  TIP, in practice,  would  be no less, and possibly  more  restrictive  and 
arbitrary  than  conventional  controls,  and no more effective  than  conven- 
tional  controls.  Several  points  should  be mentioned  regarding  the imple- 
mentation  of TIP. First,  the restricted  coverage  contemplated  for penalty 
TIPs requires  a more direct  and mandatory  wage restraint  in such areas 
as state and local governments,  nonprofit  institutions,  and small  firms- 
where,  as Rees points  out, the building  trades,  teamsters,  and  other  strong 
unions are organized.  Wallich and Weintraub  recognize  that coverage 
must  be restricted,  but imply  that exemptions  can safely  be made.  How- 
ever, if relative  wages were raised significantly  outside the area of cov- 
erage,  that would threaten  the viability  of TIP where it is supposed  to 
apply  because  various  traditional  wage  patterns  cut across  the boundaries 
defining  the area  of coverage. 
Second,  the implementation  of TIP might  prove  to be less impersonal 
and automatic  than the implementation  of controls  and, to that extent, 
no less abridging  of freedom. (To identify  freedom  with legal liberty  is 
to mistake  a part for the whole.) Definitional  and computational  prob- 
lems, as outlined  by Ackley and Rees, might arise  in specific  situations; 
and, while they would be neither  unique  nor insoluble,  their resolutions 
would require  interpretation,  the exercise of discretion,  and, therefore, 
bureaucracy. 
Guidelines  would  have to be set for TIP; at least in Okun's  version  of 
TIP, these would include price guidelines  as well as wage guidelines.  I 
agree  with Rees that price guideposts  would be both a political and an 
economic  necessity.  I would go further  in one direction  than Rees does 
in his discussion  of wage norm issues and not as far in another.  In my 
view, a TIP guidepost  should  provide  full compensation  for the prospec- 
tive rate of inflation.  TIP is logically and admittedly  designed  to cope 
with  only the cost-push  component  of inflation-which would slow along 
with  wages-and  the government  should  ensure  that  inflation  from other 
sources  does not erode  real wages.  Aggregate  demand  policy must avoid 
excess demand.  And government  policies in other areas must concern 
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a "low"  wage norm  real wages would  fall relative  to trend  productivity. 
Such  a program  would  be difficult  to achieve;  and trying  for it could even 
yield a perversely  restrictive  effect on aggregate  demand as a result of 
large  penalty  taxes imposed  under  TIP. Achieving  it would depend  on a 
mixture  of persuasion  and legal sanctions  characteristic  of conventional 
incomes  policies, in addition  to the tax disincentive.  Such a low, down- 
ward-ratcheting  norm  for wage increases  could be established  and peri- 
odically  reestablished  only under  a political  process  that has come to be 
known as "big-gun  bargaining,"  which involves the labor movement, 
some type of management  ball team, and the government. 
I would not go so far as Rees in holding  that TIP requires  a norm  for 
wage  increases,  while an effective  system  of controls  would not. A norm 
admittedly  entails two disadvantages.  First, it can act as a red flag for 
some of the otherwise  more resigned  or contented  bulls in the pasture. 
Despite  this, its net effect  might  still be to restrain  wage behavior,  espe- 
cially if it serves as a signal  for moderation  to nonunion  firms  and if it 
can serve as a scapegoat  for some union leaders who might otherwise 
press  for excessively  rich settlements  against  their own better  judgment. 
Second,  it is difficult  to develop  a norm  that would allow room for justi- 
fiable  "exceptions"  without  sacrificing  clarity  or signaling  efficiency.  But 
these problems  also exist for controls. Under controls, the authorities 
must  have some wage or price  targets  in mind;  and these cannot  long re- 
main classified  information.  A system of controls,  whether  legal or de 
facto, could operate  with a more obscure  central  guidepost  than a TIP 
system.  However,  it is not true that TIP needs a guidepost  that controls 
can  avoid  altogether. 
Rees also claims that a TIP would probably  "increase  both the fre- 
quency  and the duration  of strikes,"  whereas  controls  act as an effective 
deterrent  to striking.  Wallich  and Weintraub  question  the former  propo- 
sition. They argue  that the prospect  of a penalty  tax increase  could dis- 
courage  unionists  from striking  by stiffening  the employer's  backbone, 
and thus reducing  the prospective  gains from a strike. Seidman  claims 
that a TIP with a carrot  approach-a payroll  tax credit  for employees- 
would  reduce  the incentive  to strike  for and obtain  wage increases  above 
the norm; to strike, he contends, would deprive employees  of the tax 
credit  for marginal  increases  above  the norm  and also for all increases  up 
to the norm. 
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in assessing  strike prospects: (1)  maximum,  or potential, bargaining 
power,  which  would  maximize  the increase  in the employer's  labor  costs, 
given  the market  conditions  that determine  the employer's  ability  to pay 
and to resist and given various  determinants  of the goals and militancy 
of the union's  members;  (2)  desired  bargaining  power, which reflects 
membership  attitudes  but other  things  as well and is reflected  in the de- 
mands  by the union's  negotiators  and  leadership;  and (3)  actual  bargain- 
ing power,  or the actual  results  of collective  bargaining.  The question  of 
how  TIP would  affect  bargaining  cannot  be answered  a priori.  A TIP pen- 
alty tax would increase  employer  resistance,  but if unions were not ex- 
ploiting  their  maximum  bargaining  power,  the tax stick  would  neither  dis- 
courage  unions from striking  nor result in reduced  settlements.  This is 
consistent  with Rees' observation:  "When  the union has the power to 
win a long strike,  it does little good to strengthen  management's  back- 
bone." It is indeed possible that a tax penalty would in fact reduce a 
union's  bargaining  potential  below previously  achievable  target levels. 
But if the target  levels were maintained,  or not reduced  in proportion, 
union  dissatisfaction  would  be increased  and so would strike  activity,  al- 
though  actuLal  negotiated  increases  would presumably  be reduced.  Seid- 
man's tax carrot is designed to reduce bargaining  targets, but it will 
prove  tempting  only if the wage  norm  under  TIP is sufficiently  high rela- 
tive to the union's target to make the difference  between the two less 
than  the probable  costs of striking  for the target.  There  is no presumption 
that a given norm will be consistent  with the achievement  of the two 
policy  targets  of price  stability  and  industrial  peace. 
These  possibilities  illustrate  another  characteristic  that  TIP shares  with 
other  forms of incomes policy, including  controls: the levels of perfor- 
mance  that can be specified  and achieved  through  enforcement  are gov- 
erned  by the public,  by political  tolerance  of industrial  disputes,  by the 
more  narrowly  economic  cost of enforcement,  as well as by tolerance  of 
unemployment  and  inflation.  But  if more  strikes  and  the  winning  of strikes 
by unions  are to be counted  as a cost of TIP, that cost must  be weighed 
against  an institutional  gain, which helps distinguish  TIP from other 
wage-restraint  policies. TIP does preserve  a role for union bargaining. 
In this respect,  TIP brings  to mind the theoretical  basis of the Swedish 
active  labor  market  policy,  which  was designed  to reduce  aggregate  money 
demand  relative  to output  and hence to increase  the resistance  to union 
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This method  was developed  by the chief union economist  of the Swedish 
Federation  of Trade  Unions  in the aftermath  of an unsuccessful  incomes 
policy. 
Despite the advantage  of preserving  a role for collective  bargaining, 
the prospect  of more or longer strikes  under TIP may not enhance  its 
prospects  of acceptance  by the general  public,  management,  or the  unions. 
But  it is worthwhile  asking  what  order  of magnitude  the cost of additional 
strikes  is likely to be. Since  World  War  II, only a little less than a quarter 
of 1 percent of working  time has been lost due to industrial  disputes. 
Moreover,  the economic  costs of strikes  are often estimated  without  net- 
ting them  against  any gains that they generate  in the form of smaller  in- 
creases  in costs and  prices.  On the premise  that one New Yorker cartoon 
deserves  another,  I recall one in which the chairman  of the board com- 
plains  to his fellow directors,  "We  haven't  had a strike  in ten years. We 
must  have  been overpaying  them  all along."  If TIP increases  strikes,  with 
the added  social  and  economic  costs,  it should  also increase  the associated 
gains. 
The criterion  implied  in the last statement  should  be expanded  to in- 
clude  other  costs associated  with  TIP, including  bureaucratic  costs.  I con- 
cur with the view that TIP is not a "free  policy lunch."  It is not totally 
free of the costs attributable  to a conventional  system  of controls;  nor is 
its effectiveness  independent  of the level of its acceptance  in principle  by 
labor  and management.  One question  to be asked  is whether  a TIP with 
controls  and  persuasion  is more  cost-effective,  in the broadest  sense,  than 
a system  of controls  with  persuasion  but without  TIP. This question  can- 
not be answered  a priori. 
In my opinion,  a system  with a selective  and discriminating  tax incen- 
tive is preferable  to one without  it. Given  general  acceptance,  such a tax 
incentive  should prove an effective  way to penalize the rogue elephant 
or to deter  others  from straying  from the herd.  For the same  reason,  the 
use of discriminating  tax reductions  may be preferable  to across-the- 
board reductions,  unless the latter can be conditioned  on restraint  by 
wage (and price) setters.  The prospects  for contingent  tax reductions  are 
limited  by two considerations.  First, in a system of decentralized  wage 
determination,  individual  units cannot readily afford to be guided by 
macroeconomic  considerations.  Second, some of  the most powerful 
groups  of workers  are, almost  by definition,  least likely  to suffer  the con- 
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power. The authorities,  representing  the general public-including the 
minority  groups  that  are  weakest  economically-are unfortunately  not in 
a strong  position  in this big-gun  bargaining  encounter.  They are not in a 
position  to condition  expansionary  tax reductions  on wage restraint  be- 
cause  their  desire  for high  levels  of employment  may  well exceed  even  that 
of powerful  unions. In this general  respect,  therefore,  TIP is preferable 
to general  tax reductions  precisely  because  it is inherently  contingent  on 
prior  wage  restraint. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  in the discussion  differed  with Rees' characteriza- 
tion of the bargaining  process.  Sidney  Weintraub  said that Rees had as- 
signed  union leaders  too large a role and that he had neglected  the part 
played  by union members  and the labor movement  in general.  Rees re- 
plied that  union  leaders  tended  to be more  restrained  than  their  member- 
ship. It was the membership  that had broken  wage  guidelines  in the past 
by rejecting  settlements  reached by the leadership.  He favored union 
democracy  but  pointed  out that  it increased  the pressure  on union  leaders 
to produce  larger  gains at the bargaining  table.  Martin  Baily argued  that 
Rees had  overemphasized  the union  sector  and  a particular  model  of wage 
settlements  in that sector.  Even if a maximization  model is not accepted 
as appropriate,  competitive  pressures  impinged  on the bargaining  process. 
The majority  of the labor  force  is not unionized,  and wages  in the union- 
ized and nonunionized  sectors affect one another  directly.  In addition. 
there  are  indirect  influences  through  the product  markets  and  through  the 
option of unionized  firms  to produce  something  in-house or to subcon- 
tract  it to smaller,  nonunion  firms. 
Laurence  Seidman  observed that a TIP scheme might have a sub- 
stantial  impact  on the firms  that Rees had said would not be influenced 
by TIP. Even though  an unprofitable  firm  might  not be directly  affected 
by a penalty  TIP on profits,  the knowledge  that  TIP would  make  its profit- 
able  competitors  resist  a high-wage  settlement  would  lead it to be tougher 
in its own wage negotiations.  Even aggressive  unions  with sufficient  mar- 
ket power  to ignore  TIP would discover  that their real or relative  wage 
objectives  could  be achieved  with  lower  wage  increases  if wages  elsewhere 
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Baily and Seidman  both disagreed  with Rees' assertion  that manage- 
ment's  aggressiveness  would not be seriously  strengthened  by TIP. They 
said that management's  resistance  would depend on the cost of settle- 
ments, and management's  opposition to each proposed wage increase 
would  now  be greater. 
Weintraub  suggested  that additional  features  could be added to TIP 
to meet  some of Rees' objections.  In particular,  some  way could  be found 
to encourage  wage  resistance  by firms  that  were  incurring  losses and  there- 
fore were not subject  to profits  tax. He also noted that the government 
could augment  TIP effects  by contracting  only with firms  that had ad- 
hered  to wage  rate standards.  He noted that the Davis-Bacon  act already 
constituted  a form of incomes  policy on government  construction.  Rees 
added that by changing  the administration  of the Davis-Bacon  act so 
that the prevailing  wage was the median wage in any market, wages 
mandated  by the act would be substantially  reduced.  But this has never 
been  done  because  it is too costly  politically. 
Michael  Wachter  found  both start-up  problems  and ongoing  problems 
with TIP. Because  the wage structure  is always  in disequilibrium,  start- 
ing up a TIP program  unfairly  penalizes  those wages coming  up for new 
settlement.  Furthermore,  the government  frequently  has a stake in col- 
lective bargaining  outcomes  and becomes  involved  in such negotiations 
through  the Federal  Mediation  and  Conciliation  Service.  TIP could  place 
the government  in the position  of inducing  a settlement  and then taxing 
the outcome.  But Charles  Holt replied  that one important  benefit  of TIP 
would  be to take  the government  out of the collective  bargaining  business. 
Wachter  also noted that TIP differed  from controls  only in degree,  so 
that it risked  the same problems  of misallocation  on the one hand or of 
being discredited  by excessive  settlements  on the other.  Seidman  replied 
that although  a TIP with a prohibitive  tax on high settlements  would be 
equivalent  to controls,  a TIP with a reasonable  penalty  had the advantage 
of allowing  the necessary  relative  wage adjustments  to take place. Hlow- 
ever, Lloyd Ulman cautioned  that it might  not be possible to allow the 
required  relative  wage changes  and meet a particular  inflation  objective 
at the  same  time. 
Seidman  reasoned  that labor's  fears  that TIP would  be biased against 
labor's  share  of income  could  be allayed  by "real  wage insurance"  rather 
than treated as an insurmountable  obstacle. Baily argued  that income 
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record  showed  that  controlling  inflation  was good  for labor.  From  1950 to 
1969, labor's  share had declined,  but real gross earnings  had risen 16 
percenit.  In the 1970s, its share  had increased,  but real earnings  had not 
risen.  George  Periy added  that labor's  resistance  to a penalty  TIP would 
almost  certainly  be greater  than  its resistance  to a reward  TIP. Politicians 
who did not want  to vote to penalize  wage gains  could hardly  be equally 
persuaded  not to reward  socially  desirable  wage behavior. 
Charles  Holt felt that Rees had concentrated  too narrowly  on the role 
of a penalty  TIP in stiffening  the backbone  of management  and thought 
most  problems  with the details  of a TIP plan could  be solved.  He offered 
his own employee-oriented  TIP, with a target  range  within  which wage 
adjustments  would  not be affected  (to allow room for necessary  relative 
wage changes) and with rewards  and penalties  for wage changes  below 
and  above  the  range. 